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dearly everyone, from daily readers
of the American Banker to devotees of
It's a Wonderful Life or Bonnie and
Clyde, somehow learns a few basic facts
about banking. Most people know that a
bank accepts deposits and uses the
money to make loans. Many people be-
lieve that if too many depositors want
their money back at once, the bank will
fail. What would people think if they
knew banks could make loans without
taking in deposits, and sell loans when
depositors want their money returned?
The loan sales market allows just that.
This practice may only mildly inconven-
ience Hollywood producers, but it raises
deeper and more fundamental questions
for bankers and policymakers.
Traditionally, policymakers have viewed
banks as "special" because they invest
primarily in highly illiquid assets and, by
and large, finance these assets with ex-
tremely liquid liabilities—checkable de-
posits. Bank portfolios, which consist of
illiquid loans, are difficult to value and
costly to liquidate. This makes banks a vi-
tal resource for the important small-to-
medium-business sector. But the ability
to fund high-information assets comes at
a cost. Depositors, especially small sav-
ers, may find it difficult and expensive to
evaluate the quality of bank assets. There-
fore, in lieu of routinely monitoring the
institution to protect themselves from
loss, they rely on their ability to cash out
their deposits at the first sign of trouble.
Thus, the consequence of funding illiq-
uid, information-intensive loans with li-
abilities that are essentially "payable
on demand" is a banking system that is
vulnerable to runs, panics, and sys-
temic collapses. This "banks are spe-
cial" view is the rationale for govern-
ment supervision and regulation of
banks, including federal deposit insur-
ance and Federal Reserve discount win-
dow operations.
The existence of loan sales modifies the
traditional view in three ways: 1) a bank
can reduce the need for deposits by sell-
ing its loans; 2) a bank can sell the now-
liquid loans when it needs cash; and 3) a
widely observable price for loans makes
it easier for small depositors to ascertain
the true health of their bank.
From the banker's perspective, loan
sales offer both the possibilities of
profit and the danger of a decline in the
importance of banks. A small bank
with few deposits or low capital can
turn over a large number of loans, col-
lecting the origination fees and pocket-
ing the sales profits. A bank of any size
can buy loans to diversify its portfolio,
becoming less dependent on the ups
and downs of local industry. On the
other hand, loan sales imply an unbun-
dling of the origination and investment
functions of bank lending and a reduc-
tion in the advantages associated with
funding loans with deposits. To the ex-
tent that this erodes the competitive ad-
vantage of banks in lending markets,
The loan sales market, which reached
a peak in the latter half of the 1980s,
remains substantial despite the recent
recession and the falloff in merger
and acquisition activity. Does this
emerging market reflect a dispersal of
traditional banking services or an ex-
pansion of banks' fundamental role as
financial intermediaries? In either case,
the answer should lead to further analy-
sis of the rationales for federal deposit
insurance and bank regulation.
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Yet, if it's so easy to make and sell loans,
why haven't Wall Street firms replaced
banks in this market, just as commercial
paper has replaced short-term bank loans
to Fortune 500 firms? Do banks sell
loans because they have new ways to sig-
nal their traditional proficiency in moni-
toring and evaluating them as a result of
advances in information and communica-
tions technology? Or is it simply because
regulation has made such sales profit-
able? The answers to these questions will
help us to determine whether loan sales
indicate a dispersal of traditional banking
services or represent an expansion of
banks' fundamental role as financial inter-
mediaries. In either case, all of us—
scholars, regulators, managers, and cus-
tomers— must rethink what a bank does,
as well as how it is supervised, regulated,
and protected.
In this Economic Commentary, we
hope to stimulate that discussion by ex-
amining the loan sales contract itself
and the impact of legal and accounting
issues in shaping the loan sales market.
By documenting the market's growth
during the second half of the 1980s and
its subsequent downturn in the early
1990s, we try to establish who buys
and sells loans, how mergers and acqui-
sitions affected the market, and what
impact the 1990-91 recession had on
loan sales.
• The Loan Sales Contract
When a bank makes a loan, it creates an
asset: the promised future payments by
the borrower. When the bank sells the
loan, it transfers these promised pay-
ments to the buyer, who then assumes
all of the default and interest-rate risk.
Loan sales contracts typically fall into
one of three categories based on the
role of the selling bank after the sale oc-
curs. Regardless of type, a loan sale re-
moves the loan from the selling bank's
balance sheet for both regulatory and
accounting purposes.
The most common type of loan sale is
the participation. Here, the originating
bank continues to hold the formal con-
tract between the bank and the borrower.
The selling bank collects payments, over-
sees the collateral, and examines the
books. In many cases (termed silent par-
ticipations), the borrower does not even
know the loan has been sold.
A less common but still important type
of loan sale, the assignment, transfers
the debtor-creditor relationship to the
loan buyer. This gives the purchaser
some rights to take direct action
against the borrower in the event of
nonperformance or default. Assign-
ments do not completely remove the
original bank from the picture. It may
retain obligations to the borrower, such
as loan commitments, or hold the lien
on any collateral backing the loan.
The rarest, and most complete, type of
loan sale is the novation. Like the sale of
a stock or bond, a novation completely
transfers all rights and obligations of the
selling bank to the buyer, and the origina-
tor leaves the picture entirely.
Except in the case of novations, then,
selling a loan is less of a "clean break"
than is the sale of some other asset,
such as a bond or a house. Although in
certain types of sales the originating
bank retains some relation with the firm
—such as serving as a conduit for pay-
ments and balance-sheet information—
regulators will allow a bank to remove
a loan from its books only if the buyer
shoulders all of the associated risk.
Otherwise, the bank must hold capital
against the loan even though it has
been sold. Therefore, to obtain the full
advantages of a sale, the entire loan
must be sold off, the bank can provide
no recourse to the buyer, and the loan
must be sold to maturity (for example,
the bank cannot sell only the first 15
years of interest on a 30-year loan).
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Selling loans creates a potential prob-
lem for banks. These products, now
marketable, increasingly resemble tradi-
tional securities such as bonds and de-
bentures. Banks don't want loan sales
to be classified as securities, because
they hope to avoid federal securities
regulation and the associated disclo-
sure laws, reporting requirements, and
tougher set of legal standards. Further-
more, they need to steer clear of the
Glass-Steagall prohibitions against un-
derwriting securities. The courts have
generally held that loan sales are not se-
curities, in part because banks have
taken pains to structure the contracts
properly. For example, once sold, loans
are rarely resold, because such a trans-
action would make them seem too
much like a security.
• Market Participants: What They
Sell, Who Buys, and What They Pay
Slightly more than one-third of all
banks sell loans. Larger banks predomi-
nate in the volume of total loans made
as well as in the volume of loan sales.
The type of loans sold has changed
over time, in both maturity and quality.
In the early 1980s, banks mainly sold
short-term (under 90 days) domestic
commercial and industrial loans to
investment-grade (BBB or better) bor-
rowers. However, the average maturity
of loans sold has lengthened as the mar-
ket has developed. As of June 28,
1993, the nine major banks tracked by
the newsletter Asset Sales Report had
$58.94 billion of loans sold outstand-
ing, of which only $6.46 billion had
maturities of less than a year. TheTABLE 1 LOAN SALES BY TYPE OF PURCHASER, 1987-92
(Billions of dollars)
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SOURCE: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surrey on Bank Lending Practices. August issues from 1987 to 1992.
lengthening of maturities has been ac-
companied by a pickup in sales of
loans to lower-quality borrowers. With
the exception of 1992, in every year
since 1987 less than half of all loans
sold by banks in the Federal Reserve's
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
were obligations to investment-grade
borrowers (see table 1).
Major buyers of loans include other
banks (foreign and domestic), nonfinan-
cial corporations, and other nonbank fi-
nancial intermediaries, such as insurance
companies and pension funds. Banks re-
porting loan sales on the Senior Loan Of-
ficer Opinion Survey indicated that from
1987 to 1992, foreign banks purchased
more than 42 percent of all loans re-
ported as sold. Domestic banks were the
next-largest buyers of loans, accounting
for more than 36 percent of sales, with
nearly 26 percent purchased by large do-
mestic banks (assets exceeding $2 bil-
lion) alone.
An integral aspect of this market is its
pricing structure. Prices of highly rated
loans closely track those of commercial
paper and the London Interbank Offer-
ing Rate (LIBOR). Not surprisingly,
yields on lower-rated loans show a
greater spread. The February 1, 1993,
issue of Asset Sales Report lists the
spread between the 30-day Al/Pl
(highest-rated) loan sales yield and
commercial paper as -2 basis points,
showing that short-term loan sales can
even sell at a premium to commercial
paper. For loans with a lower rating,
A2/P2, the spread was 18 basis points.
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• Recent Trends and Their Causes
No story about the loan sales market
would be complete without a chapter
on its dramatic growth during the mid-
1980s and its sudden decline around
the turn of the decade. Fully compre-
hending the implications of loan sales
for financial intermediation requires an
understanding of what factors or events
led to the surge in loan sales, and
whether they were related to advances
in communication and information
technology or driven by regulatory and
legal changes in the development of
this market.
To track the market's performance, we
use data on loans sold and purchased by
banks covered by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation's Bank Insurance
Fund. Our main sources are the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Coun-
cil's Quarterly Reports on Income and
Condition, or "call reports." The data on
loan sales extend from March 1984 to
December 1992. Loan purchases start
later, in June 1987.
Figure 1 plots the aggregate level of
loans sold and purchased. Note the ex-
plosion in the loan sales market be-
tween 1986 and 1988 and the sub-
sequent collapse from 1989 to 1991.
Loan purchases, though much smaller
than sales (because many firms other
than domestic banks purchase loans),
remained fairly steady over the entire
period. Similar patterns emerge when
we plot sales and purchases as a per-
centage of net loans and leases. The tre-
mendous growth and subsequent de-
cline in loan sales were thus not the
result of variation in the volume of
loans outstanding.
Economic activity certainly played a
role in the market's rise and fall. The
spectacular upturn in loan sales oc-
curred during the longest peacetime
economic expansion in U.S. history,
and the peak of the market, in 1989, ar-
rived just before the 1990-91 reces-
sion. However, though the initial down-
turn may have come as a cyclical
response to the recession, loan sales
have continued their decline during the
ensuing recovery. Bank purchases have
remained steady at a somewhat lower
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SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Quarterly Reports on Income and Condition, 1984 to 1993.
much more to this story than can be ex-
plained by economic fluctuations.
One familiar version attributes the
growth and decline of loan sales to the
boom and bust in the market for merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&A) during the
1980s. Banks did provide an important
source of funding for this market and
did routinely sell large M&A credits as
participations in the past decade. More-
over, the falloff in M&A activity, par-
ticularly in leveraged buyouts (LBOs),
exhibits a pattern broadly similar to
that of the loan sales market.
Table 1 shows that for banks participat-
ing in the Senior Loan Officer Opinion
Survey, the M&A market story holds
some validity. For the overall market,
however, merger-related lending can-
not explain the pattern of loan sales vol-
ume. Figure 2 plots loan sales and total
M&A activity.
6 The M&A series over-
states bank involvement in this market
because banks were not the sole fund-
ing source. Even so, the level of this ac-
tivity is simply too small to account for
either the rise or the drop in loan sales
volume. A closer look at figure 2 sug-
gests that mergers could have played a
major role before 1987, when the mar-
ket first developed, but not since.
Other determinants, such as regulation
and the institutional structure of banks
and banking markets, are harder to pin
down. A recent study of ours provides
some insights into these additional fac-
tors.
7 In that paper, we find that a
bank's organizational structure, its in-
vestment decisions, and its financing
strategies are important influences on
its loan sales activity. Consider, for ex-
ample, the negative relationship be-
tween loan sales and bank capital. By
selling a loan, a bank with low capital
avoids both the minimum capital re-
quirement and the need to raise more
capital. The burdens of regulation thus
provide a motive to sell loans. On the
other hand, banks with an abundance
of local deposits and a strong capital
base tend to buy loans.
The evidence also suggests that loan
sales are a response to the prohibitions
on interstate branching, which limit
bank access to local deposits as well as
hinder geographic diversification of as-
sets and liabilities. We find that banks
that have trouble acquiring enough lo-
cal deposits often sell loans and that
there is a regional pattern to both loan
sales and loan purchases. Corroborat-
ing evidence comes from the positive
relation between bank holding com-
pany (BHC) status and loan activity.
Currently, interstate expansion requires
a BHC to own separately chartered
banks in each state. Loan sales and pur-
chases, in turn, are a critical tool for
managing a BHC's balance sheet. This
market allows the BHC to move assets
across its subsidiaries, minimizing
funding and regulatory costs by match-
ing loans and deposits across these
separately chartered units. Such asset
reallocations would not be necessary if
banks could branch across state lines,
since a branch bank faces only a single
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Finally, while our study indicates that
these institutional factors significantly
influence loan sales and purchases, ad-
ditional factors that are harder to quan-
tify must account for the bulk of the
market. These most certainly include
advances in information and communi-
cations technology and changes in the
legal environment that have made loan
sales feasible. Moreover, loan sales ap-
pear to be a natural product for banks
that specialize in merchant banking and
high-tech finance, such as Morgan
Guaranty Trust and Bankers Trust.
• Conclusion and
Policy Implications
Even though the current volume of
loan sales has dropped to less than half
its peak, the market remains substantial
(about $120 billion in 1992:IVQ). The
market's continuing force, coupled with
the meager actual effects of theories
predicting its demise (such as the col-
lapse in M&As), implies that loan sales
will not fade from the financial land-
scape. Additional evidence is found in
the market trend away from short-term
loans made to investment-grade bor-
rowers toward long-term loans made to
noninvestment-grade companies.
From a public policy perspective, un-
derstanding the loan sales market helps
all of us to realize how banking is
changing and requires us to rethink our
rationales for both the federal safety
net and bank regulation. Fundamen-
tally, loan sales lead us to reevaluate
the reasons for making banks special.
The government's role as lender of last
resort via the discount window pre-
supposes a need to convert illiquid
bank loans into liquid assets. The loan
sales market allows banks to make
such a conversion on their own, and in
some cases may substitute for discount
window lending.
Similarly, to the extent that this added
liquidity makes banks less vulnerable
to panic attacks, the need for deposit
insurance is lessened. The current loan
sales market, concentrated among
larger banks and untested by a finan-
cial panic, cannot replace either the dis-
count window or deposit insurance.
Still, in the search for the best and most
efficient financial regulation, this mar-
ket progression may suggest a more
gradual evolution in policy.
A further policy concern is that similari-
ties between loan sales and securities
point to increasing competition be-
tween banks and other financial institu-
tions and a further blurring of the lines
that separate them. Bank loans look
more like securities—more likely to be
bought and sold—while some financial
firms seem more like banks after buy-
ing and holding portfolios of bank
loans. Thus, one must assess the degree
to which regulation treats similar firms
similarly, and the extent to which bank
regulation and the access of banks to
federal deposit insurance places them
at a competitive advantage or disadvan-
tage to other financial firms.• Footnotes
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